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Congress enacted The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 over the protests of small busi-
ness advocates who claimed that the ADA would trigger a wave of bankruptcies. Although the
pro￿tability of ￿rms may suﬀer from the costs of ADA compliance, no systematic evidence is avail-
able. This paper seeks to determine if the ADA had a measurable impact on both the entry of new
￿rms and the failure rates (exit) of existing ￿rms.
The data used in the study are counts of business establishments currently operating by county
and type of business. Backing out the entry and exit rates from the establishment count data is a
major econometric contribution of the paper.
The empirical results imply that the ADA indeed decreased the number of retail ￿rms. There
were fewer retail ￿rms after the ADA was passed, and the drop was larger in states in which the
ADA was more of a legal innovation, and in states that had more disabled people, more ADA-related
lawsuits, and more ADA-related labor complaints. The same conclusions hold when baseline trends
for larger establishments (those least vulnerable to the costs imposed by the ADA) are diﬀerenced
out. There is also evidence that employment and access discrimination suits imposed real costs
on retail stores, encouraging exit. However, the exit of incumbents was partially oﬀset by new
entrants, which may imply that stores less able to adapt to the new requirements made room for
the entry of stores better able to adapt. So, while the prediction by the pessimists that the ADA
would cause ￿rms to fail may be correct, the decline in the number of ￿rms was partially oﬀset by
new entry.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is the most recent major federal antidiscrimi-
nation law. The ADA seeks to prevent employment and wage discrimination of disabled workers,
and to ensure the physical accessibility of businesses to disabled customers. Congress enacted the
ADA over the protests of small business advocates who claimed that the ADA would trigger a wave
of bankruptcies. Despite allegations, no systematic evidence has been presented to substantiate
or refute this claim. The pro￿tability of smaller ￿rms may be vulnerable to the costs of ADA
compliance. These costs stem from provisions mandating accommodation of disabled workers and
customers, and from the civil lawsuits and penalties to which the ADA exposes ￿rms.
The immediate question this paper seeks to answer is if the ADA had a measurable impact on
the number of ￿rms, the entry of new ￿rms, and the failure rates of existing ￿rms in the retail
sector. We focus on retailers because they are subject to both the employment and customer
accessibility provisions of the ADA. The empirical results imply that the ADA indeed decreased
the number of retail ￿rms. There were fewer retail ￿rms after the ADA was passed, and the drop
was larger in states in which the ADA was more of a legal innovation, and in states that had
more disabled people, more ADA-related lawsuits, and more ADA-related labor complaints. The
same conclusions hold when baseline trends for larger establishments (those least vulnerable to
the costs imposed by the ADA) are diﬀerenced out. There is also evidence that employment and
access discrimination suits imposed real costs on retail stores, encouraging exit. However, the exit
of incumbents was partially oﬀset by new entrants, which may imply that stores less able to adapt
to the new requirements made room for the entry of stores better able to adapt. So, while the
prediction by the pessimists that the ADA would cause ￿rms to fail may be correct, the decline in
the number of ￿rms was partially oﬀset by new entry.
2The investigation also makes two subsidiary contributions. The ￿rst is an inquiry into the
response of industry dynamics to increases in costs. In the theoretical model developed in section
4, we show that increases in marginal and ￿xed costs may have interesting and non-obvious eﬀects
on entry and exit. Before costs change, the model exhibits behavior that matches the retail sector
examined here: fewer but larger ￿rms over time, and signi￿cant amounts of entry and exit. When
costs rise, the market quantity supplied falls, but the number of ￿rms may rise or fall due to
composition eﬀects as the size distribution of ￿rms changes. In addition, regardless of how the
number of ￿rms changes, entry and exit of ￿rms may each increase or decrease. The main potential
outcomes from a cost increase are the competitor neutral case, in which entry decreases and exit
increases, the entrant favoring case, in which entry and exit both increase, and the incumbent
favoring case, in which entry and exit both decrease. The model places restrictions on which
outcomes are possible given which costs rise (marginal or ￿xed). The entrant favoring case can
arise only from an increase in marginal cost (when demand is inelastic), which favors small entering
￿rms relative to larger incumbents. The incumbent favoring case can come about only from an
increase in ￿xed cost, which favors incumbents with their larger market share relative to small
entrants. These restrictions allow us to infer the nature of the cost increases caused by the various
components of the ADA. The same model could easily be adapted to examine the impacts of other
forms of cost-increasing regulation or exogenous process innovation on industry dynamics.
The second subsidiary contribution of the paper is an econometric model that allows entry
and exit rates to be estimated from counts of currently operating ￿rms. Given that the impacts
of the ADA on ￿rms may be subtle, a large data set is required to assess the evidence with any
degree of precision. The data used in the study are the comprehensive Census Bureau counts of
business establishments by county and type of business. Thus, the data are counts of the number
of businesses currently operating in a year, and do not directly give entry and exit rates. There is
no publicly available data set as disaggregated and as large that gives direct information on entry
3and exit.1 While standard count models can be used to investigate changes in the number of ￿rms
in the market, backing out the entry and exit rates from the establishment count data is the major
econometric contribution of the paper. Borrowing techniques from queuing theory, we develop
the maximum likelihood estimator for a generalized Poisson queuing system based on the available
count data. The model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in and correlation between the entry
and exit rates. Identi￿cation of the entry and exit rates is secured through the assumption that entry
and exit are Poisson stochastic processes, conditional on time-varying covariates and correlated,
gamma-distributed mixing terms (i.e., random eﬀects that relax the Markovian assumptions in
the model). Although we use techniques drawn from the existing queuing theory literature, the
likelihood for the count data is non-trivial to derive and we have not seen the likelihood for this
model presented elsewhere. We develop this model here out of necessity, due to the particular
limitations of the available data; however, there are many other potential applications for the
econometric model. We return to these possibilities in the ￿nal section of the paper.
The queuing system2 adopted to recover entry and exit rates is an extension of a simple M/M/∞
model.3 The ￿rst extension is to introduce dependence in the entry and exit rates on covariates
that evolve period to period. The second extension is to add correlated random eﬀects in the entry
and exit rates. Conditional on these random eﬀects, entry and exit are Markovian; unconditionally,
duration dependence is allowed in the processes. We denote the model a CMt/CMt/∞ queuing
system, where the CM is for ￿conditionally Markovian￿ and the subscript denotes rates that vary
each period. In this queuing system, each period nature ￿r s td r a w sap a i ro fh e t e r o g e n e i t yt e r m s
that enter the speci￿cation of the rates for the entry and exit processes (this is made precise in
1Other researchers have exploited the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) from the U.S. Census Bureau to
study entry and exit. The LRD, however, covers only the manufacturing sector, which is not likely to be aﬀected
by Title III of the ADA, as explained below. The new Longitudinal Business Database, also from Census, covers the
retail sector and is a promising resource; it was not yet available when the present study was begun.
2Bunday (1996) provides an accessible introduction to queuing theory.
3Kendall notation provides a compact description of a queuing system: an A/B/c system has interarrival time
distribution A, service time distribution B,a n dc servers. A and B are chosen from a few traditional symbols such
as M for the exponential distribution (for its Markovian property).
4section 5). Conditional on these random eﬀects4 and the period-speci￿c entry rate, ￿rms enter with
an exponential interarrival distribution. Once in the system, a ￿rm￿s lifetime (again conditional on
the heterogeneity terms and a period-speci￿c rate) has an exponential distribution.5 Uncondition-
ally, the entry and exit processes have less restrictive functional forms, as is discussed in section
5.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the costs that the ADA
creates for ￿rms. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
model of ￿rm dynamics and response to the ADA. In Section 5, we formalize the CMt/CMt/∞
econometric model and present the likelihood of the data. Section 6 discusses empirical strategies
to identify impacts of the ADA on the number, entry, and exit of retail ￿rms, and includes the
results of the estimations. A ￿nal section concludes and discusses the broader applicability of
the theoretical and econometric models in the paper. Proofs and the detailed derivation of the
CMt/CMt/∞ likelihood are in an appendix.
2 The Costs of the ADA for Firms
The ADA was passed in July 1990. Most likely to aﬀect private ￿rms are Title I, which prohibits
discrimination by employers against disabled individuals, and Title III, which (among other things)
bans discrimination in access to private commercial facilities. Title I protects disabled individuals
who can perform the ￿essential functions￿ of a position, both in applying for a job and once on
payroll. The employer is not allowed to discriminate against disabled workers in hiring, ￿ring, or
wages. The employer is required to make ￿reasonable accommodations￿ for disabled workers, as
long as accommodation does not create ￿undue hardship￿ (which is not de￿ned) for the employer.
The employment provisions took eﬀect July 1992 for ￿employers￿ with 25 or more employees, and
4Such heterogeneity terms are also known as mixing terms.
5The in￿nite-server assumption means that the ￿rm￿s exponentially distributed lifetime ￿begin￿ immediately upon
e n t r y ;t h e r ei sn o￿ q u e u i n gf o ras e r v e r ￿ .
5two years later for businesses with 15-24 employees. Smaller ￿rms remain exempt.
Title III of the ADA requires businesses to make accessible all areas of stores where customers
might go. In addition, it instituted a national building code for new construction: up to 20% of any
construction or remodeling costs must be spent on accessibility. Title III took eﬀect January 26,
1992 for businesses with more than 25 employees, six months later for ￿rms with 11-25 employees,
and one year later for smaller ￿rms.6
What then are the costs of the ADA to ￿rms?7 The non-discrimination clause means that
employers cannot base hiring, ￿ring, and wage decision solely on the marginal product of the
individual worker, which may lead to higher operating costs. Other costs stem from real or perceived
violation of the law. Enforcement of Title I is delegated to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). From July 1992 to September 2001, 158,280 discrimination charges have been
￿l e dw i t ht h eE E O C . 8 When a worker ￿les a charge, the EEOC investigates, attempts to settle,
and in some cases sues the ￿rm (or gives permission to the worker to privately sue the ￿rm). Of the
11% of charges leading to non-litigated compensation, the average bene￿t paid to the worker was
$19,226.9 If the case is litigated and the plaintiﬀ prevails, the ADA requires ￿rms to pay remedies,
such as back pay and all court costs.10 A related law (the Civil Rights Act of 1991) also makes the
￿rm liable for damages ranging from $50,000 to $300,000.11 Thus costs come from three sources.
The ￿rst two are the direct accommodation costs for disabled workers12 and the litigation, remedy,
6In addition to the employee count, the businesses with 11-25 employees also had to have gross receipts of less
than $1,000,000, and the businesses with 0-10 employees had to have gross receipts of less than $500,000.
7This section draws on the similar discussion in Acemoglu and Angrist (2001).
8These data are from the EEOC, available from <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html>.
9Ibid.
10Court costs in employment practices suits average $50,000 to $100,000 per claimant (Dertouzos, 1988; Chanzit,
2001).
11Compensatory damages averaged $395,197 in the 101 successful suits for wrongful termination due to discrimi-
nation (of which ADA suits are a subset) in California during 1992-1996.(Jung, 1997) Plaintiﬀs prevailed (through
verdict or settlement) in about 38.1% of such cases. Punitive damages averaged another $895,863 in the 25 cases
with punitive damage awards. These ￿gures do not include out-of-court settlements.
12There are no good estimates of the magnitude of accommodation costs. A non-random survey cited in Ace-
moglu and Angrist (2001) ￿nds average costs of $930 per accommodation through 1997, but this ￿gure does not
include involuntary accommodations, the value of time spent on compliance, or reduced eﬃciency of the ￿rm due to
compliance.
6a n dp e n a l t yc o s t s . T h et h i r di st h ec o s to fan e wk i n do fi n s u r a n c et h a th a sa r i s e ni nr e s p o n s e
to such lawsuits. In the past decade, more ￿rms have begun to purchase Employment Practice
Liability Insurance (EPLI), with basic premiums ranging from $5,000 to $20,000 per year.
The costs of Title III stem from similar sources. One estimate places access accommodation
costs at $500￿$3000 on average (Chebium, 2000).13 Enforcement of Title III is up to the Justice
Department; civil penalties can be as high as $110,000 per violation, and remedies such as repay-
ment of court costs and construction costs can make losing a Title III case even more expensive
for a ￿rm.14
These actual and expected costs prompted small business advocates to lobby hard against the
ADA, claiming that it would trigger a wave of bankruptcies (Teltsch, 1993). While no such wave
of bankruptcies has been reported in the press, there certainly have been thousands of lawsuits,
and the law may have had subtle eﬀects on the decisions of ￿rms to enter or exit markets. For
example, if there are diﬀerences in the organizational adaptability of ￿rms, then the changed legal
environment may have induced those ￿rms to exit which found it most costly to adapt, making
room for the entry of new ￿rms that ￿nd it less costly to adapt. In this case, the number of ￿rms
in a market may change little, even though the turnover rate of ￿rms increases during the period
of adaptation and transition. This example highlights why entry and exit rates are interesting in
their own right, instead of looking only at the number of ￿rms in the market.
3 Relevant Literature
Three strands of literature come together in this paper: empirical studies evaluating the eﬀects of
the ADA, the industrial organization literature on ￿rm entry and industry dynamics, and applica-
13The estimate is from the National Federation of Independent Businesses. The most common accommodation
is ensuring wheelchair access. Some court-ordered accommodations are less obviously needed, including one that
required a bank to install Braille signs on the driver￿s side at drive-through teller locations (Hudgins, 1995).
14It is diﬃcult to estimate the number of lawsuits ￿led under Title III. The DOJ ￿les suit itself relatively rarely
and only for high-pro￿le cases; the DOJ does not track private suits. In section 6 I use a measure of Title III suits
brought to judgment in the federal court system.
7tions of queuing theory in economics. There are but a few studies in the economic literature on the
ADA. Schumacher and Baldwin (2000) ￿nd relatively few diﬀerences in the labor market outcomes
of disabled workers between 1990 and 1993, suggesting that the ADA had little impact, positive or
negative. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) show with diﬀerent data that not only did the ADA fail
to help disabled workers, that in fact, it appears to have reduced the employment of disabled men
of all ages and of women under age 40. These studies focus on the labor market.15 This paper
extends the empirical literature on the ADA to the impacts on the ￿rm￿s pro￿tability and industry
dynamics.
Numerous empirical studies in industrial organization examine the entry or exit of ￿rms.16 Af e w
empirical regularities emerge from these studies (see Geroski (1995) for a review). First, within an
industry, high entry rates are correlated with low exit rates (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988).
This ￿ts the usual intuition that when conditions are pro￿table in a market, not only are new
entrants attracted to the market but existing ￿rms are unlikely to exit. Second, there are large
cross-sectional variations in the entry and exit rates of industries (Dunne et al., 1988; Geroski, 1995).
Third, across industries in the cross section, high entry rates are correlated with high exit rates
(Dunne et al., 1988; Honjo, 2000). Fourth, the hazard rates (exit rates) estimated from panel data
typically decline with the age and the size of ￿rm (Hall, 1987; Evans, 1987).17 In the age dimension,
therefore, there is negative duration dependence.18 We view these four stylized facts as necessary
possible outcomes for any econometric model; the CMt/CMt/∞ model can accommodate them all.
All of these studies use longitudinal data on individual ￿rms in the manufacturing sector. Geroski
and Mazzucato (2001) is one of the few studies that models the number of ￿rms in the industry
15Virtually the only other empirical economic study on the ADA is DeLeire (2000).
16There is also a large related literature in the ￿elds of corporate demography and organizational ecology. See
Carroll and Hannan (2000) for an overview.
17It is well known that estimated negative duration dependence may be a spurious result of estimating a common
hazard rate for ￿rms that actually have constant but diﬀering rates. I account for this explicitly in my econometric
model.
18A notable exception is Holmes and Schmitz (1995), who ￿nd that the hazard rate may be ∪-shaped for small
￿rms run by their founders.
8directly, in a dynamic setting.19 Unlike the present work, Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) do not
attempt to back out the entry and exit rates from the data.
Among the theoretical studies of ￿rm entry and exit, three of the prominent models are Jo-
vanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Klepper (1996). The model in section 4 is based on Klepper
(1996),20 which is a more convenient model to work with than the complex dynamical system in
Jovanovic (1982) and admits non-steady state analysis more easily than does the model in Hopen-
hayn (1992). Our theoretical model simpli￿es Klepper (1996) by abstracting away from innovation
(which is not as important in our retailing context as in Klepper￿s (1996) manufacturing setting)
and adds a microstructure for costs for the sake of exploring the various channels through which
the ADA might increase ￿rms￿ costs.
There are many applications of queuing theory in economic literature, but empirical applications
of queuing theory (e.g., De Vany and Frey (1982); Daniel (1995); Prieger (2001; 2002a; 2002b)) are
scarcer than theoretical studies. None of these empirical queuing studies attempts to infer arrivals
and departures from the number of units currently in the system, as we do here.
4 The Theoretical Model
In a longer version of the paper, we construct a model to investigate the response of industry
dynamics to increases in costs. For the sake of brevity, here we will only describe the impacts that
the ADA is assumed to have on costs and the results from the theoretical model; the details of
the model and proofs are omitted. In each period t =1 ,2,..., there is a continuum of atomistic
potential entrant ￿rms indexed by their ￿xed cost F ∈ [F, ﬂ F] ≡ F,0 <F< ﬂ F. The variable inputs
of a ￿rm are capital K, with price r, and workers. Workers are either disabled (D, with wage wD),
or not (L, with wage wL). The production technology of each ￿rm is identical, and is described
19There are several structural models of entry in static settings (see Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) and Berry (1992)
for seminal papers).
20See also Klepper (2002).
9by the constant returns to scale production function q = G(L,D,K)=γ(L + eD)αK1−α, γ>0,
α ∈ (0,1), where e ∈ (0,1) is the relative eﬃciency of disabled workers. Note that disabled and
nondisabled workers are perfect substitutes at rate e nondisabled workers for one disabled worker.
Each unit of disabled labor requires an accommodation cost a>0; assume that e would be
zero in the absense of accommodation of disabled workers. It is assumed that both disabled and
nondisabled workers are active in the labor force, which in a competitive labor market requires
that wD = ewL−a; the substitutability of labor implies that ￿rms are indiﬀerent between disabled
and nondisabled workers at those wages. Labor supply of both types is assumed to be completely
elastic at the given wages. Under these assumptions, the marginal cost of production is constant
at βwα
L, where β is a function of (α,γ,r).21
After the passage of the ADA, costs change for several reasons. First, the equal-pay provision
of the ADA mandates that wD rise to wL. It is assumed that to minimize the risk of lawsuits, labor
employed by each ￿rm is now composed of D and L in the same proportion as in the labor force at
large. Let x b et h ef r a c t i o no fw o r k e r st h a ta r ed i s a b l e di nt h el a b o rf o r c e .S e c o n d ,u n d e rt h eA D A
￿rms that have entered the market are exposed to potential litigation costs. Litigation is of two
types: employment discrimination suits, as authorized under Title I of the ADA, and accessibility
suits, as authorized under Title III.
Employment suits may stem from (perceived) hiring discrimination and wrongful termination
of disabled workers. Assume that ￿rms lay oﬀ and replace fraction θ of their work force each period,
that the size of the pool of potential hires is H, and that each worker composing H applies for only
one of the positions open in the current period at each ￿rm, and that H is large compared to any
one ￿rm￿s labor demand. A disabled applicant that is not hired for a position sues with probability
 H;t h e￿rm (assumed to be risk neutral) has expected costs of AH from each suit, inclusive of
litigation, settlement, and damages awarded. Then the expected cost from hiring discrimination
suits is xH HAH ≡ ΛH. A disabled worker that is ￿red sues with probability  T and expected cost
21In particular, β ≡ (δ
1−α + δ
−α)r
1−α/γ,w h e r eδ ≡ α/(1 − α).
10AT. The expected termination costs are therefore θD TAT ≡ ΛTD. This formulation implies that
hiring suits raise ￿xed costs and that termination suits raise marginal costs.
Accessibility suits may also raise both ￿xed and variable costs. The expected number of acces-
sibility suits is sF(y)+sV (y)q,w h e r ey is the fraction of the population that is disabled; sF and sV
are assumed to increase with y.H e r esF may represent the suits ￿led by activists or otherwise oc-
curring without respect to the size of the ￿rm.22 The term sV q represents suits ￿led by customers,
and is therefore assumed to be proportional to output. The expected cost of each Title III suit to
the ￿rm is AIII. Letting ΛF ≡ sFAIII and ΛV ≡ sV AIII, the total expected cost of accessibility
suits is ΛF + qΛV .





wL +( a + ΛT)x




q + F + ΛH + ΛF (1)
≡ c(x,ΛT,ΛV )q + φ(ΛH + ΛF)+F (2)
where the other arguments of marginal cost c are suppressed. With this notation, pre-ADA costs
have marginal cost c(0,0,0) and ￿xed cost φ(0).
Entry, production, and exit in the model are similar to the model of Klepper (1996), and are
not described in detail here. Consumers view ￿rms￿ products as homogeneous. Market demand is
a function of the current market price only, and increases (for given p)o v e rt i m e .I fa￿rm stays
in the market it keeps all previous customers and attracts a share of new buyers (and those whose
previous supplier exited) in proportion to last period￿s market share￿. The ￿rm can also sell more
product by incurring a marketing cost. Market price declines and the market quantity increases
over time in equilibrium, and therefore the quantity for any ￿rm staying in the market increases
over time.
Since ￿rms are atomistic, they are assumed to be price takers. Firms can project the current
22There are several cases reported in the press of litigants actively seeking out ￿rms to sue under the ADA. A
Florida lawyer has sued over 740 businesses, mostly on behalf of a single disabled activist group (Voris, 2001). Another
individual in California has ￿led 350 ADA suits, claiming to lose only one (Valcke, 2002). Such litigants appear to
be ￿equal opportunity suers￿, ￿ling against ￿rms of all sizes.
11period￿s market-clearing price, but are myopic in that they base entry, exit, and production decisions
only on current period￿s pro￿ts, and do not anticipate the passage of the ADA before it happens.
Given an expectation of the market-clearing price, each ￿rm decides by how much to expand
output should the ￿rm decide to be in the market. Firms will enter (or stay in the market) if there
optimized pro￿t is positive, and will not enter (or will exit) if it is negative.
The equilibrium price is determined by supply equaling demand under the optimal entry, exit,
and output expansion decisions.
The model exhibits behavior that matches many of the retail subsectors during the relevant time
period: fewer but larger ￿rms over time,23 with signi￿cant amounts of entry and exit.24 Against
this backdrop we can now examine the impact of the ADA. In the period the ADA comes into
eﬀect, it is assumed that the ￿rms know that costs have changed before they make their entry, exit,
and output decisions.
Lemma 1 (Impact of the ADA) In the period t in which the ADA is ￿rst in eﬀect, the following
hold, compared to the same period were the ADA not in eﬀect:
1. Equilibrium price rises and equilibrium quantity falls.
2. The number of entering ￿rms can increase or decrease; the same is true for incumbent ￿rms.
3. The number of ￿rms in the market can increase or decrease.
The ￿rst point results from the fact that variable and ￿xed costs rise for all ￿rms, and the
demand function is unchanged. The second and third results may be shown by simulation of the
model. Given that the market quantity falls, when the number of ￿rms increases it must be that
23In SIC 54, food stores, the main subsector examined in the empirical work, the average number of ￿rms was 59.2
in 1988, rose to 61.4 in 1992, and then fell to 56.9 by 1997. The percentage of ￿rms with fewer than 20 employees
fell from 82.4% in 1988 to 80.0% in 1997.
24For example, from 1995 to 1996 there was an 11.1% birth rate and 10.5% death rate in the retail sector (source:
Statistics of U.S. Businesses, Census Bureau).
12Entry of New Firms Exit of Incumbents Nomenclature
decreases increases competitor neutral
decreases decreases incumbent favoring
increases increases entrant favoring
increases decreases unlikely
Table 1: Possible Changes in Entry and Exit in Response to cost increases
each ￿rm produces less, or smaller entrants replace larger incumbents (a composition eﬀect),25 or
both.
Thus, this relatively simple model generates interesting, varied, and non-obvious responses to
the cost changes. The possibilities for entry and exit are listed in Table 1. The most intuitive case
is the competitor neutral case, in which entry decreases and exit increases in response to the cost
changes. When entry increases, it can be shown that the scale of entry also increases. Thus, since
the market quantity falls, entry increases only at the expense of the number of incumbents, the
quantity each incumbent produces, or both. We term the case in which entry increases and the
number of incumbents falls, entrant favoring. The case in which entry increases and exit decreases
we term unlikely, for the reason that although it is a theoretical possibility, it is unintuitive and
we cannot generate it in simulations. When exit decreases, unless we are in the unlikely case the
extra incumbents remain in the market at the expense of forgone entrants. This case is incumbent
favoring. In the competitive neutral case, the number of ￿rms falls, while in the unlikely case the
number of ￿rms rises. In the entrant and incumbent favoring caes, the number of ￿rms can rise or
fall.
Examining when the various cases are likely to occur allows us to link these observable outcomes
to the unobservable changes in the parameters of the model. Recall that the eﬀect of the ADA is
to raise marginal cost c and ￿xed cost φ. The following theorem characterizes the impacts that the
changes in cost have on entry and exit.
25Entrantsalwaysproducelessthandoincumbents.
13Theorem 2 Let period t be when the ADA is ￿rst in eﬀect. Using the de￿nitions from Table 1,
the following hold:
1. If demand is inelastic at the equilbrium price, the entrant favoring case can arise only from
increases in c.
2. The incumbent favoring case can arise only from increases in φ and only when demand is
inelastic at the equilbrium price.
3. The unlikely case can arise only from increases in φ.
The insight behind these results is sketched here. When costs increase, there are two competing
eﬀects on the number of ￿rms in a cohort that will remain in the market: a direct eﬀect and a
price eﬀect. The direct eﬀect is that rising costs directly reduce pro￿ts. The indirect eﬀect acts
through the market price; when costs rises, the equilibrium price rises, which is good for ￿rm￿s
pro￿ts ceteris paribus. Which eﬀect predominates cannot be told in general. However, although
something can be said for particular cases and cohorts.
When φ rises and demand is inelastic at the equilibrium price, if the number of ￿rms rises in
any cohort, it rises for the oldest cohort. Thus entrant favoring is not possible, because entrants
are the youngest cohort (the ￿rst point in the theorem). When φ rises and demand is elastic,
however, if the number of ￿rms rises in any cohort it rises for the entering cohort, and entrant
favoring is possible (but not required). Regardless of the elasticity of demand, entrant favoring is
possible when c rises. Concerning the last two points of the theorem, we show that increases in
c increase exit from each incumbent cohort, and so incumbent favoring and the unlikely case are
not possible. Furthermore, because of the behavior mentioned above when demand is elastic, the
incumbent favoring case requires not only increases in φ but also inelastic demand.
The implications of the model useful for empirical work are thus threefold. First, the only
way the ADA could cause an increase in the number of ￿rms, net of trends, is if ￿xed costs rise
14(through ΛH and ΛF). This ￿rst implication has no bite in the application here, because it turns
out that all ADA-related variables are correlated with reductions in the number of ￿rms. Second,
when demand is inelastic (as it is in the empirical application to food stores), an entrant favoring
outcome from the ADA can come only from increases in x, or through ΛT and ΛV , which increase
marginal cost. Third, an incumbent-favoring outcome can come only through ΛH and ΛF,w h i c h
increase ￿xed cost. The competitor-neutral outcome implies no restrictions on the nature of the
cost increase. In section 6, we use these latter two implications of the model to infer which elements
of the ADA raised which costs.
5 The Econometric Model
In this section we present the econometric models used in the investigation. The ￿rst question of
interest is the eﬀect of the ADA on the number of ￿rms. To answer this question, we use standard
count data models. The ￿rst is a Poisson regression model, which assumes equality of the mean and
the variance, but yields consistent estimates even if there is overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi,
1998). The other count models incorporate various forms of heterogeneity and overdispersion: a
negative binomial regression model, a Poisson model with ￿xed eﬀects at the state level, and a
Poisson model with gamma-distributed random eﬀects at the county level. Since a Poisson model
with gamma-distributed individual random eﬀects generates a negative binomial model (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1998), the only diﬀerence between the second and fourth models is that in the latter
the random eﬀect is constrained to be equal within a county over time.
The other question of interest is the eﬀect of the ADA on entry and exit. For this question
we construct the ML estimator for the parameters of the CMt/CMt/∞ system. The entry of
￿rms is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with gamma mixing. In particular, the interarrival
times (the epochs between the times at which entry occurs), conditional on a gamma-distributed
heterogeneity random variable u, are exponentially distributed with instantaneous rate λ(t) at
15time t. The lifetime of each entered ￿rm, conditional on another gamma-distributed heterogeneity
random variable v, is exponentially distributed with instantaneous rate µ(t). Conditional on (u,v),
the entry and exit processes are independent; dependence is introduced by means of correlation
between u and v. The random eﬀects serve several roles in the model. They may capture the
eﬀects of unobservables have on entry and exit. They may also, by allowing correlation between
entry and exit, capture congestion eﬀects. Congestion in this application refers to the notion that
in areas where incumbent ￿rms are long-lived, fewer new ￿rms may attempt entry.26
In our data the number of currently operating ￿rms is observable, but not the entry and exit
times. We derive the likelihood function for the number of ￿rms using techniques from queuing
theory (Srivastava and Kashyap, 1982).27 For the substantially easier problem where the arrival
and exit times are observable, see Prieger (2001; 2002a;2 0 0 2 b) for models and applications. To
economize on notation, the model will be explicated for a single time series of ￿rm counts; the
panel dimension will be introduced later below. Let N(s) be the random variable generating the
number of ￿rms (i.e., ￿rms that have entered but not exited) at time s ∈ [0,T], n(s) be a realization
of N(s),a n dnt be the number of units in the system at the end of period t ∈ {1,...,T}.F o r
simplicity each period is of unit length (one year, in the application), so that nt = n(t).
The entry rate λ(s) and the failure rate µ(s) are taken to be constant within a period, so that
λ(s)=λt and µ(s)=µt for s ∈ [t − 1,t). The rates are modeled as:





ut = λ0tut (3)





vt = µ0tvt,( 4 )
where α and β are vectors of parameters, Xt and Zt are vectors of observed explanatory variables,
26In physical queuing systems, congestion is modeled directly by assuming a ￿nite number of servers. Within
an in￿nite server model, there are two main approaches to incorporating congestion. The ￿rst is through bivariate
random eﬀects as described here. In the second method, one includes covariates re￿ecting the system state, such as
the number of recent arrivals or the number of units in service, directly in the determination of the arrival or service
time rates. See Prieger (2002b) for an example of the latter approach.
27For a more advanced theoretical treatment of queues with time-varying parameters, refer to BrØmaud (1981,
section VI.2).
16and ut and vt are unobserved heterogeneity terms with distribution28
f(u,v)=G(γ,σ2
uvτ;u)G(δ,σ2
v;v),γ , δ , σ 2
u,σ2
v > 0 (5)





In addition to the restrictions on the parameters in (5), it is also necessary that τ>−(2σ2
v)−1 for







v Γ(τ + δ)
(8)
These normalizations ensure that E(λt)=λ0t and E(µt)=µ0t, which is required for identi￿cation
of the intercept terms in α and β. With these restrictions, Va r(v)=σ2
v, Va r(u|v) is linear in σ2
u,
and Va r(u) is aﬃne in σ2















where g is as de￿ned in note 29. The correlation has the same sign as τ,c a nt a k et h ef u l lr a n g eo f
values on [−1,1],30 is zero if and only if τ =0 , but is not in general monotonic in τ.
From (5) it is clear that v has a marginal Gamma distribution, whereas u has a Gamma distri-
bution only when conditioning on v.31 In particular, the marginal distribution of u is not Gamma
distributed. We choose a conditional Gamma distribution for u purely for convenience; it allows
the unobserved heterogeneity in the entry process to be integrated out analytically. Numerical in-
tegration is thus required only to integrate out v, a single integral rather than a double integral.32
28This distribution is from Gran (1992, sec.2.7.5).





















30For example, when τ =1 , ρ → 1 as σ
2





v,t h e nρ →− 1 as τ → 0 from below and σ
2
v → 0.
31No structural interpretation is assigned to this formulation (i.e., that entry depends on exit but not vice versa).
Of course v also has a distibution conditional on u.
32There is no bivariate distribution with correlation for which both the marginal and conditional distributions are
Gamma (Arnold, Castillo and Sarabia, 1999, sec.4.6).
17Gamma mixing in Poisson and exponential distributions is commonly used, because it leads
to closed-form likelihoods and has well-known properties. A Gamma-Poisson mixture results in a
negative binomial random variable that allows for overdispersion (for which the Poisson distribu-
tion alone cannot account). A Gamma-exponential mixture results in a Pareto distribution, and
relaxes the exponential￿s imposition of a constant hazard rate.33 As is true with any mixture of
exponentials, the hazard rate for a Gamma-exponential mixture is decreasing, which implies that
there is (unconditional) negative duration dependence and overdispersion. In particular, one can
show that mean time remaining to exit, conditional on survival to t, increases linearly in t.D u b e y
(1966) also uses Gamma-exponential mixtures for ￿rm lifetime data.
The heterogeneity in the model thus exhibits properties that ￿t the stylized facts of ￿rm entry
and exit mentioned in section 3: overdispersion to account for the large variance in entry and exit
rates across industry groups, correlation between the entry and exit rates, and duration dependence
in the life of the ￿rm. The CMt/CMt/∞ model thus combines ￿exibility through the random eﬀects
to account for these features, with the analytical convenience of a Markovian queuing system. The
former is desirable to ￿t the stylized facts; the latter is necessary to ￿nd a (near) closed form for
the likelihood.
From the model speci￿ed above, the likelihood of the data can be obtained. The derivation
is in the appendix. Finding the pdf of nt|nt−1,d e n o t e df(nt|nt−1), requires integrating out the
unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, f(nt|nt−1) is


















33See Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1995, p.574).
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1 − e−µt¢nt+nt−1−2m, (13)
G is as in (6), Mt ≡ min{nt−1,n t}, κ0 = λ0/µ0, and restrictions (7)￿(8) are imposed.
As can be seen from (10), the ut term can be integrated out analytically, while the vt term
cannot, leaving a unidimensional integral in the expression for f(nt|nt−1). In the application, we
use Gauss-Laguerre quadrature to numerically integrate this expression.
To ￿nd the joint likelihood of the data (nt)T
t=1,n o t et h a tN(t) is a Markov process. Therefore
f (n1,...,n T|n0)=
QT
t=1 f (nt|nt−1). Now we may introduce the cross-section dimension of the
panel, and write nt as ntjk,t h en u m b e ro f￿rms in year t in size group j in county k. In some
speci￿cations, as described in the next section, the j dimension collapses because n is the total
number of ￿rms of all sizes. Assuming that (utjk,v tjk) are independent across time, size group,

























Let ￿ θ be the ML estimate obtained from maximizing lθ. Because the Hessian of (10) is com-
plicated and expensive to calculate, maximization techniques and variance estimators that require
only the gradient are an appealing choice here. We use the BFGS variant of the DFP algorithm in
the application, and report BHHH standard errors.
6 Data and Empirical Results
One would expect that if the ADA impacted any ￿rms, it would be those in the retail sector. Retail
￿rms are exposed to costs under both Title I through employment and Title III through access by
19customers to their premises. The retail sector has many small ￿rms operating on thin margins,34
and is also involved in many of the ADA lawsuits. The dependent variable in the estimations here
is therefore the number of retail establishments by major SIC group within a county; the data
cover the whole U.S. except Alaska.35 Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 2.
Togetasenseoftheoveralltrendsinthedata,considerFigure1,whichshowsthepercentage
changes in the total number of retail establishments by two-digit SIC code. Some subsectors are
growing and some are shrinking, but (with several exceptions) each line in the graph generally trends
down. Except for SIC 52 (building materials and garden supplies) and 53 (general merchandise
stores), every group saw decreased growth rates in 1993, the ￿rst full year the ADA was in eﬀect,
compared to the previous year. In all but one of these cases (SIC 58, eating and drinking places),
growth was negative in 1993. Given that the ADA may be a relatively minor determinant of the
number of ￿rms, however, compared to changes in demand and other costs, and given the dynamic
industrybehaviorpredictedbythemodelinsection4evenintheabsenseoftheADA,Figure1
should not be read as strong evidence by itself for impacts of the ADA. Instead, it may mainly
show the trends that we will have to diﬀerence out in the analysis.
Although results from all retail subsectors are summarized below, we focus on SIC 54, food
stores(theheavylineinFigure1).36Foodstoreswerechosenforthreereasons.First,theyhave
relatively small, local markets, for which counties may be an adequate approximation. Establish-
ments in other retail groups, such as SIC 53 (which includes department stores) and 54 (which
includes automotive dealers) are more likely to have market areas that span multiple counties.
34By 1980, 93.4% of the sector was eﬀectively competitive, based on concentration ratios (Shepherd, 1982).
35The data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns CD-ROM, years 1987-1997. Although
establishments are not the same as ￿rms, the establishment seems to be the best unit to match to the ￿employer￿ in
the language of the ADA, in terms of how the courts have interpreted Title I. Even if an establishment does not exist
as its own legal entity, it may be judged an ￿employer￿ separate from related establishments according to a legal test
considering (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations and
(4) common ownership or ￿nancial control (EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 67).
36SIC major group 54 includes retail stores primarily engaged in selling food for home preparation and consumption
(grocery stores). It excludes restaurants and liquor stores. The other major retail groups are 52 (building materials
& garden supplies), 53 (general merchandise stores), 55 (automotove dealers & service stations), 56 (apparel and
accessory stores), 57 (furniture and homefurnishings stores), 58 (eating and drinking places), and 59 (miscellaneous
retail).
20Second, in comparison to restaurants (in SIC 58), the other natural choice by the ￿rst criterion,
the relatively smaller number of food stores per county makes the estimation of the heterogeneous
models more feasible.37 Third, demand for food consumed at home, which these stores sell, is con-
sistently estimated in the literature to be inelastic (e.g., Barnes and Gillingham, 1984). Restricting
investigation to a good with inelastic demand allows part 1 of Theorem 2 to be applied.38
We use three empirical speci￿cations to identify potential eﬀects from the ADA on the number,
entry rate, and exit rate of ￿rms. The speci￿cations enable increasingly stringent tests of the eﬀects
of the ADA, moving from diﬀerences in means pre- and post-ADA to diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
speci￿cations.
6.1 Speci￿cation A: diﬀerences in means
The simplest speci￿cation, A, uses the number of ￿rms of all sizes per county in a year and focuses
on pre- and post-ADA comparisons. The index X0
tkβ in each speci￿cation can be used for the
standard count models for the number of ￿rms, in which the mean is an exponential function of
X0
tkβ, or for the entry and exit rates λ and µ in the CMt/CMt/∞ model (i.e., X0
tkβ stands in
for the indices X0
tα and Z0
tβ in the notation of section 5). The index for year t and county k,i s
speci￿ed as
X0
tkβ = β0 + υr + ϕp + π0Wtk
where υr is a Census region ￿xed eﬀect and ϕp is a period ￿xed eﬀect. The three periods are p =1 ,
the pre-ADA period 1988-1992, p =2 , the initial ADA period 1993-1994, and p =3 , the subsequent
ADA period, 1995-1998. Period 2 spans the ￿rst full year that the ADA was fully in eﬀect for any
size ￿r m( 1 9 9 3 )a n dt h ee n do ft h ep h a s ei np e r i o d( 1 9 9 4 ;r e f e rt os e c t i o n2 ) .T h er e g i o nd u m m y
υEAST and ϕ1 are normalized to zero. Covariates W include county land area, population, conty
37The summation in (30) implies that estimation time is roughly proportional to the sum of the dependent variable,
not the number of observations. Some of the heterogeneous speci￿cations for SIC 58 took weeks to run, which limited
the number of speci￿cations it was feasible to try.
38This is another reason not to use SIC 58. Food consumed away from home is often estimated to have price elastic
demand (Barnes and Gillingham, 1984).
21per capita income, labor cost (average real wage and salary disbursements per job), and capital cost
(proxied by the Moody￿s Baa bond rate, net of the in￿ation rate39), all in logs. The speci￿cation of
the entry and exit rates are identical (in this and all speci￿cations); there is no exclusion restriction
required for identi￿cation, and any variable aﬀecting pro￿t a b i l i t yw i l la ﬀe c tb o t he n t r ya n de x i t
decisions of ￿rms. In speci￿cation A, the only evidence for the ADA￿s eﬀect comes from ϕt for the
two ADA periods, which capture changes in the number of ￿rms, entry, or exit after the act was
in eﬀect. Such evidence can only be suggestive, since the period indicators may merely pick up
trends unrelated to the ADA.
The ￿rst results are from standard count models for the number of establishments. Recall
from part 3 of Lemma 1 that the number of ￿rms could rise or fall from the ADA, given that
smaller ￿rms can replace larger ones. Thus we have no ap r i o r iexpectation for the signs of the
ADA-related variables in these estimations, although the most natural expectation40 is that if the
ADA increased costs then the number of ￿r m ss h o u l df a l l .F o re a c hs p e c i ￿cation, the four models
m e n t i o n e di ns e c t i o n5a r ee s t i m a t e d .
The results from speci￿cation A are in Table 3. The coeﬃcients are elasticities when the variable
is in logs (all except indicator variables). The negative coeﬃcients on the indicators for the ADA
periods (in all models) implies that the number of ￿rms decreased in the ADA periods, even after
controlling for changes in the economic variables. The economic covariates have the expected
signs41 and are signi￿cant at the 1% level, except for capital costs.42 Although the magnitudes of
some of the estimates vary a bit across estimations, for the most part the estimates are similar.
The simple Poisson model is rejected in favor of each of the heterogeneous models (both by the
signi￿cance of the overdispersion parameters and by likelihood ratio tests). This is the expected
39This follows Assadian and Ford (1997) and many other studies
40And the most common outcome from simulation of the theoretical model.
41The coeﬃcient on area ￿uctuates sign, but is always less than the coeﬃcient on population, which implies that
the implied coeﬃcient for population density is consistently positive.
42In many estimations in other SIC groups, capital costs also had the wrong sign. This is probably because the
variable is a poor proxy for the true opportunity cost of capital or that it is acting as a peculiar type of time trend
(recall the capital cost variable varies only over time, not in the cross section).
22result if the true likelihood is given by (10); the data should display overdispersion (relative to a
Poisson distribution) if they are in fact generated from the CMt/CMt/∞ model. The results from
the other retail groups are qualitatively very similar with these results from food stores.43
The theoretical model in section 4 shows that examining entry and exit in addition to the
number of ￿rms can provide insight into how the ADA aﬀects ￿rms￿ costs. We turn now to the
results from the CMt/CMt/∞ entry and exit model from section 5. The results from speci￿cation
Aa r ei nT a b l e4 ,b o t hw i t ha n dw i t h o u tr a n d o me ﬀects (heterogeneity). Several results stand out
from these estimations. Entry rates were signi￿cantly lower and failure rates were signi￿cantly
higher in the ADA periods than the pre-ADA periods in both speci￿cations (the competitor neutral
case, if all such changes can be ascribed to the ADA, which is doubtful in this speci￿cation for
the reasons discussed above). The estimates from other retail SIC groups, with some exceptions,
display the same pattern as these results for food stores.44 T h ee c o n o m i cc o e ﬃcients have the
expected signs in the entry rate (larger area, more population and higher per capita income all
increase the arrival rate; higher labor costs decrease the entry rate) except for capital costs in the
homogeneous speci￿cation (see footnote 42).
In the failure rate part of the homogeneous speci￿cation, the population coeﬃcient has an
unexpected sign: more populous counties have higher failure rates. The heterogenous speci￿cation
reverses the sign on the population failure rate coeﬃcient. The homogeneous speci￿cation is soundly
rejected in favor of the random eﬀects version, whether by signi￿cance tests on σ2
u, σ2
v,a n dτ,o r
by likelihood ratio tests. The evidence thus indicates that the random eﬀects are an important
addition to the model and may be required to get sensible estimates from the CMt/CMt/∞ model.
Correlation between the arrival and exit rates is estimated to be negative, possibly due to omitted
43The exceptions are ￿ ϕ2 in the negative binomial model for SIC 57, which is signi￿cant only at the 5% level, and
￿ ϕ2 and ￿ ϕ3 in all models for SIC 58, which are positive.
44The exceptions: for entry, 4 out of the 14 ADA period indicators from all other SIC groups are signi￿cant and
positive (homogeneous speci￿cation); for exit, 3 out of the 14 ADA period indicators are signi￿cant and negative.
The unlikely case (positive for entry and negative for exit) never occurs.
23variables that aﬀect the pro￿tability of the market.45 Correlation is consistently estimated to be
negative in every speci￿cation we estimated.
6.2 Speci￿cation B: ADA-speci￿cc o v a r i a t e s
Speci￿cation B uses the same dependent variable as speci￿cation A, total ￿rms of all sizes. New
here are the addition of ADA-speci￿c covariates. From section 4 we know that marginal cost
increases with x, ΛT,a n dΛV ,t h a t￿xed cost increases with ΛH and ΛF,a n dt h a tΛF and ΛV
increase with y. Since the litigation variables ΛT, ΛV , ΛH ,a n dΛF are not directly observed, we
proxy them with related observables. The index is speci￿ed as
X0
tkβ = β0 + υr + ϕp + ηpest−1 + ζpcst−1 + ωpdst−1 + ξpfs + π0Wtk (15)
where W includes all the variables from speci￿cation A. Both ΛH and ΛT,t h ee m p l o y m e n tl i t i g a t i o n
costs, increase with the probability of litigation ( H and  T, resp.). We proxy these probabilities by
the EEOC charge rate in state s, lagged one year. The charge rate variable est−1 (with coeﬃcient ηp)
is the number of EEOC ADA Title I charges in the state, as a fraction of prime working age disabled
population (aged 21-58), times 1,000.46 Hiring and termination charges are not distinguished in
the EEOC data; evidence on which places greater costs on ￿rms can come only from Theorem 2.
Similarly, ΛF and ΛV , the accessibility litigation costs, increase with the number of suits (sF
and sV , respectively). Instead of proxying the number of suits (which is highly correlated with
population), we proxy the probability of accommodation suit-￿ling. The case rate variable cst−1
(with coeﬃcient ζp) is the number of Title III-related federal court cases in state s and year t−1,
as a fraction of disabled adult population (aged 15+ years), times 1,000.47 As with the EEOC
45The may also be a causal explanation, if ￿rms want to enter markets in which they expect to last longer.
46The EEOC data were obtained as summary counts per state through a Freedom of Information Act request. The
disability data (here and elsewhere) are from the U.S. Census￿ Current Population Survey, following Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001).
47The case data were obtained from a search of the Lexis database (all federal trial, appellate, and Supreme Court
cases) for cases matching keywords ￿ADA￿ and ￿public accommodation￿ or ￿Title III￿. Although this is not as
accurate a means of classi￿cation as reviewing each case by hand (which is infeasible due to the large number of
court cases), a check of the cases thus matched showed this method to be fairly accurate.
24charges, it is not clear from the case data whether the Title III cases increase marginal or ￿xed
costs; again inference will be based on Theorem 2. The coeﬃcients for the charge and case rate
variables are semi-elasticities.48
Finally, because the variables x and y are highly correlated, we include a single variable dst−1
to proxy both. This variable (with coeﬃcient ωp) is the log fraction of adult population (aged 15+
years) in the state that is disabled in year t (times 100), lagged one year.
All these coeﬃcients are allowed to vary over periods; since the Title I and Title III variables
are not observed in period 1, we normalize ζ1 = η1 =0 . In the results, we report diﬀerenced
estimates (i.e., increments over the period 1 eﬀect) where applicable; for ωp we report ￿ ω1, ￿ ω2− ￿ ω1,
and ￿ ω3 − ￿ ω1,f o re x a m p l e .
There is also a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (D-D) measure in speci￿cation B. The variable fs is a
dummy for states that had a Fair Employment Practice (FEP) law with enforcement and penalties
before the ADA (fs =1if the state had a pre-ADA FEP law, 0 if not).49 Title I of the ADA was
less of an innovation in these states, and the ADA should have had less of an impact. If there is
less entry in the non-FEP states after the ADA, for example, then ￿ ξ2 and ￿ ξ3 will be positive in the
e n t r yi n d e x .T h er e s u l t si nT a b l e s5a n d6a r er e p o r t e da sD - De s t i m a t e s :￿ ξ2 −￿ ξ1 and ￿ ξ3 −￿ ξ1,t h e
diﬀerence (between FEP and non-FEP states) in the diﬀerence in X0
tkβ before and after the ADA.
Although all the variables in speci￿cation A are included in speci￿cation B, only the ADA-
speci￿cc o e ﬃc i e n t sa r er e p o r t e di nT a b l e s5a n d6 . O fi n t e r e s th e r ea r et h ed i ﬀerence and D-D
estimates. For the count models in Table 5, with the exception of the Title III case rate in the
￿rst ADA period, all of these estimates have signs (positive for the FEP state indicator, negative
for the others) associating the ADA with a decreased number of ￿rms. Increases in the percentage
of disabled adults reduce the number of ￿rms, relative to this variable￿s pre-ADA eﬀect. The
48To convert semi-elasticities to elasticities, multiply the coeﬃcient by the sample mean of the relevant variable in
Table 1.
49Although every state had some sort of FEP law before the ADA, most did not have provisions for disabled
workers that were actively enforced with penalties. These data are from Percy (1989).
25E E O Cc h a r g er a t ea n dt h eT i t l eI I Ic a s er a t e s( p e r i o d3o n l yf o rt h el a t t e r )h a v en e g a t i v ee ﬀects
on the number of ￿rms in the ADA periods. These signs are robust across models, and with a few
exceptions are all signi￿cant at the 1% level. The Title III case rate coeﬃcient for the initial ADA
period is negative but insigni￿cant in the Poisson regression, but positive in the other models. We
defer interpreting the magnitudes of the estimates until the end of this section. The results from
the other retail groups are generally in accord with these results from SIC 54.50
Table 6 has the results from speci￿cation B for the CMt/CMt/∞ model. The versions with
and without heterogeneity are generally in agreement; there are no (statistically signi￿cant) sign
changes of the estimates between versions. Of the signi￿cant estimates,51 the EEOC charge rates
in both ADA periods and the percentage of adults disabled 1993-1994 show incumbent-favoring
behavior. From Theorem 2, this implies that these variables (on net) raise ￿xed costs.52 For the
charge rates variable, this result would imply that the ADA raised hiring costs (through the  H and
ΛH variables of section 4) more than termination costs (through  T and ΛT). This seems unlikely;
Moss et al. (1999) report that fewer than 10 percent of the ADA charges ￿led with the EEOC
concern hiring discrimination. We return to this issue in the next speci￿cation.
Recall that the disability variable dst stands in for the disability variables x and y of section 4.
These variables raise ￿xed costs by increasing ΛH, the cost of hiring discrimination suits (through
x) and by increasing ΛF, a component of the cost of accessibility suits (through y). Setting aside
the possibility of signi￿cant impacts through hiring-related suits, the incumbent-favoring impact
of the disability variable may imply that accessibility suits by ￿serial suers￿ (or other such suits
not related to the scale of the businesses) have signi￿cant impacts on entry, through sF and ΛF.
Another explanation for the incumbent favoring, apart from the implications of Theorem 2, may
50The exceptions are the FEP coeﬃcients, which have mixed signs, and the disability coeﬃcients for the latter
ADA period, which are more often positive than negative.
51The estimates discussed here are those for which either the arrival or failure coeﬃcient was signi￿cant. All of
these are pairwise (i.e., the arrival or failure coeﬃcients of a single covariate) jointly signi￿cant at the 1% level, except
for % adults disabled (1995-97) in the heterogeneous estimation, which is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
52The results of Theorem 2 apply to marginal univariate increases in c or φ. Given that both may have actually
increased, I interpret the evidence as indicating that the eﬀects of the increase in φ outweigh the eﬀects of any increase
in c.
26be that negative impacts from the disability variable show up on entry and not exit if potential
entrants perceive the costs from ADA suits to be larger than incumbents actually ￿nd them to be.
The other signi￿cant estimates, the Title III case rate in the latter ADA period and the FEP
D-D estimates in both periods, show entrant-favoring behavior.53 From Theorem 2, this implies
that these variables raise marginal costs. For the case rate variable, this result is evidence that
the ADA imposed real litigation costs from accessibility suits from customers, through  V and ΛV .
Coupled with the results discussed in the previous paragraph, this bolsters the conclusion that
accessibility suits from both customers and activists measurably raised ￿rms￿ costs. The results for
the FEP variables indicates that marginal costs increased more in states for which the ADA was
more of an innovation above existing laws. The estimates from other retail SIC groups, with few
exceptions, are in accord with these results for food stores.54
6.3 Speci￿cation C: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
In speci￿cation C, we split the dependent variable into size groups. Here the dependent variable
is the number of ￿rms within each size group: small (1-19 employees), medium (20-49 employees),
and large (50+ employees), and the independent variables are as in speci￿cation B. Estimations
for the diﬀerent size ￿rms are run separately, which eﬀectively adds a size subscript j = S,M,L to
all the variables in (15). This allows all the ADA-related variables to be diﬀerenced over ￿rm sizes
as well as over time, and is the most demanding test of the ADA￿s eﬀect. In speci￿cation C, we
require not only that the ADA-related variables aﬀect the number of ￿rms, entry, or exit, but that
the impacts be greater on the small ￿rms that are most vulnerable to the ADA. By looking for
impacts on small ￿rms, net of trends for large ￿rms, potentially spurious trends aﬀecting all sizes
of ￿rms are diﬀerenced out. Recall from section 2 that the smallest ￿rms (those with fewer than 15
53Some of the main eﬀects for the FEP and disabled variables, applying to all years, are also signi￿cant. These do
not require interpretation, because they are baseline eﬀects included only to allow diﬀerencing.
54The signi￿cant exceptions (homogeneous speci￿cation) are: in SIC 56 (apparel stores), EEOC charge rates favor
entry in period 3 and non-FEP status favors incumbents period 2; in SIC 59 (miscellaneous retail), disabled adults
favor entry in period 3. The unlikely case never appears in any SIC group for any variable.
27employees) are exempt from Title I employment discrimination obligations. Therefore for the Title
I variable est we will also look at diﬀerences of medium size ￿rms from large ￿rms. The FEP state
D-D speci￿cation in speci￿cation B now becomes a triple diﬀerencing (D-D-D): over ￿rm sizes as
well. This allows the D-D estimate for large ￿rms to be a baseline, against which the incremental
eﬀects for small ￿rms can be compared.
The results are reported as D-D or D-D-D estimates. The D-D estimate labeled %a d u l td i s a b l e d ,
1993-94 in the ￿rst row of Table 7, for example, is (￿ ω2S−￿ ω1S)−(￿ ω2L−￿ ω1L): the diﬀerence (between
small and large ￿rms) in the diﬀerence in X0
tkβ from a unit change in dst before and after the ADA.
Similarly, the D-D-D FEP state estimate labeled FEP state, 1993-94 is (￿ ξ2S − ￿ ξ1S) − (￿ ξ2L −￿ ξ1L):
the diﬀerence (between small and large ￿rms) in the diﬀerence (between FEP and non-FEP states)
in the diﬀerence in X0
tkβ before and after the ADA.
Table 7 presents the results from speci￿cation C for the standard count models. The table
reports only the D-D and D-D-D calculations; each are the medium or small ￿rm estimates net of
the large ￿rm estimates. Of the signi￿cant estimates for small ￿rms, all have signs consistent with
the ADA decreasing the number of ￿rms. The Title III case rate coeﬃcient for the initial ADA
period again stands out; it is positive but insigni￿cant in all regressions. The D-D-D coeﬃcients
for the FEP state variables are positive in Table 7. These D-D-D estimates imply that not only did
the number of ￿rms fall in non-FEP states after the ADA (from the D-D estimates in Speci￿cation
B) but that the trend is more marked for the ADA-vulnerable small ￿rms than for large ￿rms.
T h el o w e rp a r to fT a b l e7h a st h eD - De s t i m a t e so ft h eE E O Cc h a r g er a t ec o e ﬃcients for medium
￿rms. These estimates are all negative, and most of them are signi￿cant at the 1% level. Taken
altogether, the evidence points to the ADA as causing the number of establishments to fall. While
causality is not directly proven here, in the D-D and D-D-D settings any alternative explanations
become increasingly complicated.
Table 8 contains the estimates of interest from the CMt/CMt/∞ model. All of the incumbent-
or entrant-favoring behavior found in speci￿cation B carries through to the small ￿rm D-D and
28D-D-D estimates, with the exception that the title III case rate in the latter ADA period no longer
has a signi￿cant eﬀect. Thus not only are eﬀects from these ADA-related variables signi￿cant, they
show up strongest for the small ￿rms likely to be most susceptible to the costs of the ADA.
The suspect ￿nding from speci￿cation B that EEOC charge rates appear to increase ￿xed costs
is still present here. However, because of the exemptions for small ￿rms, medium size ￿rms provide
a cleaner test of the eﬀect of the Title I variables. The bottom part of Table 8 has the results for the
EEOC charge rate D-D estimates for medium ￿rms (net of large ￿rms). Here, the Title I variable
exhibits entrant-favoring eﬀects in both ADA periods, which implies from the theoretical model that
the costs of termination suits (and possibly other suits from employees regarding accommodation55)
have more of an impact than hiring suits. Given that over 81 percent of charges ￿led with the
EEOC concern termination or accommodation of employees, this is a plausible ￿nding.
A caveat applies to speci￿cation C when estimating the entry and exit model. Given the
anonymous nature of individual ￿rms in the establishment counts, true exits cannot be distinguished
from size group switching. E.g., if a ￿r mg r o w sf r o m1 0t o4 0e m p l o y e e so n ey e a rt ot h en e x t ,t h e
econometric model treats it as an exit of a small ￿rm and de novo entry of a medium ￿rm. Thus,
entry and exit may be overcounted in speci￿cation C and the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients must
be interpreted with caution. By comparing ￿ λ from speci￿cation B with the sum of the ￿ λj for all
size groups from speci￿cation C, one can estimate the extent of the overcounting. Arrival rates
are overcounted 22￿25% in the ADA periods in speci￿cation C; similar calculation for the failure
rate shows overcounting of 19￿23% in the ADA periods. These ￿gures provide rough upper bounds
on the mismeasurement of the coeﬃcients; in a best-case scenario the category switching is not
related to the variables of interest, the estimate of the constant absorbs the mismeasurement, and
the other coeﬃcients are correctly estimated.
Because diﬀerences in diﬀerences of elasticities and semi-elasticities are hard to interpret, we
55Although not included in the model, suits from non-terminated employees would increase marginal costs similarly
to termination suits.
29demonstrate the magnitudes of the eﬀects of the ADA variables in Table 9. Two counterfactuals
are considered. In the ￿rst four columns, the ￿gures are the impacts on the number of ￿rms, entry,
and exit of a one standard deviation increase above the actual value of the ADA covariate in each
county. These impacts are summed over all counties, so that the ￿gures may be read as changes
in the national number of ￿rms in a year (subject to the caution about potential overcounting in
the CMt/CMt/∞ model mentioned above).56 In the rightmost columns, the counterfactual is the
impact of raising the row variable from zero to its actual value in each county. This counterfactual
applies to the Titles I and III variables, and is meant to assess the total impact of the ADA
through these channels, since without the ADA neither EEOC charges nor Title III suits would
have been possible. The ￿rst column in each counterfactual is calculated from the Poisson regression
reported in the ￿rst column of Table 7; this speci￿cation was chosen for its robustness. The next
three columns in each counterfactual are based on the estimations from Table 8 (no-heterogeneity
version57) for the entry and exit rates, and the implied change in the number of ￿rms given those
rates. The number of exiting ￿rms is calculated by applying the exit rate, which is a per-￿rm rate,
to the number of ￿rms in the county at the end of the previous period. The change in the number
of ￿rms implied by the entry and exit model is the change in the number of entering ￿rms less the
change in the number of exiting ￿rms.
In most cases where either the entry or exit estimate is signi￿cant, the signs of the direct and
implied estimates of ∆N match, which serves as a basic reality check of the CMt/CMt/∞ model.
For the single non-matching case (EEOC charge rate 1993-94), the entry estimate is not signi￿cant
and the exit estimate is only marginally signi￿cant, so there is no convincing evidence of model
misspeci￿cation here. The magnitudes of the direct estimate of ∆N can be quite diﬀerent than the
implied estimate. This is particularly true for the FEP state estimates, where the direct estimates of
∆N are several orders of magnitude higher than the implied estimates. Given the lack of precision
56The notation ∆N in Table 8 is to be read in the comparative static sense, not as Nt − Nt−1.
57The results from the heterogeneity version are less precisely estimated but qualitatively similar.
30in the estimates, it is impossible to judge whether this discrepancy results from misspeci￿cation of
the CMt/CMt/∞ model. The value of the CMt/CMt/∞ model in this speci￿cation may be not
so much the magnitudes of the estimates but, instead, the corroboration lent to the entry and exit
patterns found in speci￿cation B.
The largest impact comes from the FEP state variables. Net of trends for large ￿rms in pre-
ADA FEP states, there are over 15,000 fewer small ￿rms in the ADA periods in states without
pre-ADA FEP laws (from the direct estimate). This ￿gure is about 10 percent of the average
number of small ￿rms over the period of the sample. The entry and exit estimates indicate that
the reduction occurred through failure of existing ￿rms, and was partially oﬀset by increased entry.
The magnitudes of the eﬀects of the other variables are smaller. To highlight one other result,
consider the Title I variable. In the counterfactual in which there are no EEOC charges ￿led,
there are an estimated 1,120￿1,149 more medium size ￿rms (net of trends for large ￿rms) in the
ADA periods. These ￿gures represent an increase of 7.2￿7.4% in the number of medium size ￿rms.
Again, the entry and exit estimates indicate that the reduction occurred through failure of existing
￿rms (at least in the latter ADA period), and was partially oﬀset by increased entry.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Overall, then, there is some evidence that the ADA had real impacts on the number, entry, and
exit of ￿rms. Although the evidence is not entirely consistent in every speci￿c a t i o na n di ne v e r y
SIC group, some general conclusions can be drawn from the empirical explorations. In the ADA
period, there were fewer retail establishments than before, and the drop was larger in states in
which the ADA was more of a legal innovation, and in states that had more disabled people, more
ADA-related lawsuits, and more ADA-related labor complaints. The same conclusions hold when
baseline trends for larger establishments (those least vulnerable to the costs imposed by the ADA)
are diﬀerenced out. These results on the changes in the number of ￿rms are also consistent across
31diﬀerent speci￿cations of the count model. There is also evidence that employment and access
discrimination suits raised the marginal costs of retail stores, encouraging exit. At the same time
that the suits spurred exit, however, they are also associated with increased entry, which may imply
that stores less able to adapt to the new requirements made room for the entry of stores better able
to adapt. So, while predictions that the ADA would cause ￿rms to fail may have proven correct,
the decline in the number of ￿rms was partially oﬀset by new entry.
Apart from this speci￿c application to the impact of the ADA, the econometric model is useful
for many other empirical applications in economics when each of many events of interest is followed
by a duration. For example, consider the study of labor contract strikes. One may be interested
in the number of strikes beginning within a period, the number of strikes ongoing at a point in
time, or the duration of individual strikes. Clearly these quantities are related, and a researcher
may suspect that a change in labor law aﬀects all three. Queuing theory provides a framework
for uni￿ed analysis of the phenomenon. Other examples from economics include the analysis of
the number and duration of visits to recreational facilities and the number and time to regulatory
approval of patents or pharmaceuticals. When the start and end of the spells are observed, one can
estimate the model with the techniques used in Prieger (2001; 2002a;2 0 0 2 b). This paper extends
the estimability of the model to cases in which only the count of pending spells are observed. Such
data arise whenever census methods report stock levels (e.g., population, pending stock trades,
monetary aggregates, number of patients on a waiting list) and not ￿ows.
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8 Appendix
Derivation of the likelihood of the CMt/CMt/∞ queuing system.
In this section we treat all expressions as conditional on (u,v); in the following section we inte-
grate out the unobserved heterogeneity. From the properties of Poisson and exponential processes,
when (s,s+∆s) is strictly within a period we have the following (where o(x) denotes order smaller
than x):
Pr{1 arrival in interval (s,s + ∆s)} = λt∆s + o(∆s) (16)
Pr{0 arrivals in interval (s,s + ∆s)} =1− λt∆s + o(∆s). (17)
where s ∈ [t − 1,t). For any particular server we have:
Pr{1 exit in interval (s,s + ∆s)} = µt∆s + o(∆s) (18)
Pr{0 exits in interval (s,s + ∆s)} =1− µt∆s + o(∆s). (19)
The probability of any compound event (e.g., an arrival and an exit) is o(∆s).
From (16)￿(19) one can derive the probability of the number of units in service at time t. Most
queuing studies focus on the limiting behavior of the system, but here we are interested in the
transient behavior; in application there is no reason to assume that the system is in steady state
(or even that the system is ergodic). We begin by deriving the likelihood for nt+1 given that
N(t)=nt.
Restrict attention for the moment to behavior within a period t, during which λ and µ are
constant, and suppress the dependence on t in the notation for λ, µ,a n dn.L e t Pn(s) be the
37probability that N(s)=n. Then from (16)￿(19) one can derive a recursive equation for the
probability that there are n units in the system at time s:
d
dt
Pn(s)=−Pn(s)(λ + nµ)+Pn+1(s)(n +1 ) µ + Pn−1(s)λ, n ≥ 0; (20)
see (Kalashnikov, 1994, p.276). Add the initial condition
Pn(t − 1) = δnt−1n (21)
where δnt−1n is the Kronecker delta ( δxy equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise). Equations (20)￿(21)
form a diﬀerential diﬀerence equation known as the forward Kolmogorov equation,w h i c ha d m i t s
as o l u t i o n ,a f t e re m p l o y i n gag e n e r a t i n gf u n c t i o nt h a tr e d u c e st h ep r o b l e mt oal i n e a rp a r t i a l
diﬀerential equation.






where z ∈ C, kzk < 1. P(z,s) allows us to restate (20)￿(21) as an initial value partial diﬀerential
equation:











The solution to this partial diﬀerential equation is
P(z,s)=cexp[−κ(1 − z)] (25)
where c is an arbitrary function φ of (z − 1)e−µs and κ ≡ λ/µ is the traﬃci n t e n s i t y .T od e t e r m i n e
c, use (23) to ￿nd that
φ(z − 1)exp[−κ(1 − z)] = znt−1 ⇒ (26)








1 − (1 − z)e−µs⁄nt−1 = c (28)
58In the rest of this section, s should, strictly speaking, be ∆s, the time elapsed in the current period.
38Thus the particular solution of (25) that matches the boundary condition (28) is given by
P(z,s)=
£
1 − e−µs(1 − z)
⁄nt−1 exp[−κA(s)(1 − z)], (29)
where A(s)=1− e−µs.N o w e x p a n d t h e ￿rst term and use the power series expansion of the
exponential term to rewrite (29) as




























Pn (s) is equal to the coeﬃcient on zn in P(z,s).W h e ns has run to the end of the period, this
coeﬃcient gives us the probability of observing nt units in service at the end of period t.I t i s
therefore the density for nt, conditional on its lagged value nt−1 and on (ut,v t), which enter only
through λ and µ. Denote this pdf f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t).I ti s








where Mt ≡ min{nt−1,n t} and Bmt is de￿ned in (13). Finding the f(nt|nt−1) requires integrating
out the unobserved heterogeneity:
f (nt|nt−1)=Eu,v [f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t)] = Ev
'
Eu|v [f (nt|nt−1,u t,v t)]
“
(31)
Begin with the inner expectation and integrate out u from λ in (30). Due to the assumption that
u has a gamma distribution, conditional on v, the inner expectation may be found in closed form,
leading to (11). The outer expectation in (31) cannot be solved analytically, and so numerical
integration or simulation may be used to evaluate the density (10).
39Table 2:  Description of Data 
 
Variable  mean  s.d. 
Adult population disabled (percentage, log)  2.36  0.22 
Area (log sq. miles)  6.51  0.76 
Capital cost (real, x 100, log)  1.71  0.09 
EEOC charge rate (x 1000), 1992-1993  0.18  0.59 
EEOC charge rate (x 1000), 1994-1996  0.60  1.12 
FEP (state had pre-ADA disability law, 1=yes, 0=no)  0.32  0.47 
Labor cost (real, in thousands, log)  2.58  0.20 
Per capital income (real, in thousands, log)  2.46  0.22 
Population (log)  10.17  1.38 
Region: Midwest  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.34  0.48 
Region: South  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.45  0.50 
Region: West  (1=yes, 0=no)  0.14  0.34 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1988-1997  5.62  17.68 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1988-1991  5.46  17.67 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1992-1993  5.65  17.52 
SIC 54 establishments, large, 1994-1997  5.85  17.78 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1988-1997  5.09  12.81 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1988-1991  5.33  13.47 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1992-1993  4.91  12.14 
SIC 54 establishments, medium, 1994-1997  4.81  12.08 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1988-1997  48.46  149.09 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1988-1991  49.33  149.30 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1992-1993  48.23  150.33 
SIC 54 establishments, small, 1994-1997  47.17  147.90 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1988-1997  59.17  177.33 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1988-1991  60.13  178.52 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1992-1993  58.79  177.67 
SIC 54 establishments, total, 1994-1997  57.83  175.10 
Title III case rate (x 100,000), 1992-1993  0.01  0.08 
Title III case rate (x 100,000), 1994-1996  0.12  0.35 
 
Note: unit of observation is a U.S. county, over years 1988-1997. Table 3:  Count Model Estimation Results—Specification A 
 
  Poisson  Negative Binomial   Fixed Effects  Random Effects   
   Regression  Regression  Poisson Regression  Poisson Regression 
   estimate 
  s.e. 
  estimate 
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Difference-in-mean estimates                           
  years 93-94  -0.060 **  (0.002)    -0.061 **  (0.005)    -0.060**  (0.002)    -0.053**  (0.002) 
  years 95-97  -0.102 **  (0.002)    -0.104 **  (0.004)    -0.104**  (0.002)    -0.091**  (0.002) 
Other variables                           
  area  -0.041 **  (0.001)    0.028 **  (0.003)    -0.049**  (0.001)    0.042**  (0.008) 
  population  0.942 **  (0.001)    0.885 **  (0.002)    0.932**  (0.001)    0.850**  (0.004) 
  per cap income  0.158 **  (0.005)    0.234 **  (0.011)    0.221**  (0.005)    0.089**  (0.020) 
  capital cost  0.001   (0.009)    0.000   (0.020)    0.004  (0.009)    -0.004  (0.009) 
  labor cost  -0.140 **  (0.008)    -0.223 **  (0.014)    -0.180**  (0.008)    -0.080**  (0.025) 
  midwest  -0.276 **  (0.002)    -0.333 **  (0.006)    -0.085**  (0.015)    -0.363**  (0.022) 
  south  -0.100 **  (0.002)    -0.092 **  (0.006)    0.026**  (0.009)    -0.143**  (0.021) 
  west  -0.188 **  (0.003)    -0.257 **  (0.008)    0.065**  (0.013)    -0.317**  (0.026) 
  constant  -6.101 **  (0.021)    -5.843 **  (0.050)    -6.110**  (0.024)    -5.533**  (0.089) 
Overdispersion parameter   
                      
  a   
      0.045 **  (0.001)          0.073**  (0.002) 
                              
Log likelihood  -130,016.3    -102,431.3    -120,086.8     -87,542.1 
Pseudo R
 2  0.942    0.329    0.947    0.058 
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  Dependent variable is total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.   N = 30,578 in all estimations. The excluded 
period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-1992.  When a is zero, the second and fourth models reduce to the simple Poisson model. 
The fixed effects regression includes state-level dummy variables.  For the random effects regression, the county-level random effect 
is gamma distributed.  
 Table 5:  Count Model Estimation Results—Specification B 
 
  Poisson  Negative Binomial   Fixed Effects  Random Effects   
   Regression  Regression  Poisson Regression  Poisson Regression 
   estimate 
  s.e. 
  estimate 
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Difference estimates                           
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.031 **  (0.010)    -0.007   (0.022)    -0.058**  (0.011)    -0.053**  (0.011) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.031 **  (0.009)    -0.023   (0.020)    -0.046**  (0.010)    -0.043**  (0.010) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.043 **  (0.002)    -0.032 **  (0.004)    -0.015**  (0.002)    -0.012**  (0.002) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.042 **  (0.001)    -0.037 **  (0.003)    -0.014**  (0.002)    -0.012**  (0.002) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  -0.008   (0.007)    0.002   (0.020)    0.015*  (0.007)    0.014*  (0.007) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  -0.010 **  (0.003)    -0.004   (0.006)    -0.011**  (0.003)    -0.011**  (0.003) 
                         
Difference-in-difference estimates                         
  FEP state, 1993-94  0.022 **  (0.004)    0.011   (0.010)    0.030**  (0.004)    0.029**  (0.004) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  0.018 **  (0.004)    0.008   (0.008)    0.028**  (0.004)    0.025**  (0.004) 
                           
Main effects (apply to all years)                         
  % adults disabled  0.124 **  (0.005)    0.046 **  (0.012)    0.039**  (0.007)    0.034**  (0.007) 
  FEP state  0.049 **  (0.002)    0.042 **  (0.005)    0.154**  (0.015)    0.023*  (0.012) 
                           
Overdispersion parameter                            
  a          0.043 **  (0.001)            0.071**  (0.002) 
               
Log likelihood  -128,369.6     -102,253.1     -119,921.6    -87,412.2 
Pseudo R
 2  0.943    0.330    0.947    0.060 
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  Dependent variable is total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  N = 30,578 in all estimations. All estimations 
include all controls from Specification A (previous table).  All Difference estimates are differences from the pre-ADA period.  See 
notes to previous table.  Table 7:  Count Model Estimation Results—Specification C 
 
  Poisson   Negative Binomial   Fixed Effects Poisson   Random Effects   
  Regressions  Regressions  Regressions  Poisson Regressions 
   estimate 
  s.e.    estimate 
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Small firms differenced off large firms                           
Difference-in-difference estimates                           
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.048   (0.037)   -0.014   (0.048)    -0.124**  (0.038)    -0.131**  (0.038) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.150 **  (0.032)   -0.107 *  (0.042)    -0.153**  (0.034)    -0.163**  (0.034) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.060 **  (0.007)    -0.047 **  (0.009)    -0.030**  (0.007)    -0.026**  (0.007) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.027 **  (0.005)    -0.017 **  (0.006)    -0.012*  (0.005)    -0.008  (0.005) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  0.027   (0.023)    0.026   (0.036)    0.028  (0.027)    0.023  (0.027) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  -0.003   (0.008)    0.007   (0.012)    -0.027**  (0.009)    -0.025**  (0.009) 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences                          
  FEP state, 1993-94  0.025   (0.014)    0.021   (0.020)    0.028*  (0.014)    0.031*  (0.014) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  0.038 **  (0.012)    0.041 *  (0.017)    0.046**  (0.012)    0.045**  (0.012) 
Medium firms differenced off large 
firms  
    
      
 
             
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.087 **  (0.010)    -0.078 **  (0.012)    -0.031**  (0.010)    -0.032**  (0.010) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.042 **  (0.007)    -0.020 *  (0.008)    -0.026**  (0.007)    -0.022**  (0.007) 
* = 5% significance level; ** = 1% significance level.   
Notes:  N = 30,578 in each estimation, using SIC 54 data.  Estimates are differences across sizes of firms (as noted in first column) in 
differences over time (as noted in row headings; compared to the pre-ADA period).  For each of the count models in the columns there 
are three underlying separate estimations (one for each of small, medium, and large firms).  All variables from Specification B are 
included in each estimation; only the estimates of interest are reported above.  Table 4:  Model A—Differences in Means Before and After the ADA  
  
  No Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate 
  s.e.    estimate 
  s.e. 
Entry rate parameters   
       
   
Difference-in-mean estimates             
  years 93-94  -0.049 **  (0.016)    -0.146 **  (0.024) 
  years 95-97  -0.089 **  (0.014)    -0.084 **  (0.019) 
Other variables             
  Area  0.043 **  (0.007)    0.015    (0.012) 
  Population  1.025 **  (0.006)    0.708 **  (0.009) 
  per cap income  0.013    (0.034)    0.235 **  (0.051) 
  capital cost  0.674 **  (0.066)    -0.096    (0.103) 
  labor cost  -0.160 **  (0.052)    -0.226 **  (0.064) 
  Midwest  -0.243 **  (0.016)    -0.222 **  (0.032) 
  South  0.152 **  (0.016)    0.133 **  (0.031) 
  West  -0.233 **  (0.022)    -0.070   (0.040) 
  Constant  1.299 **  (0.017)    0.761 **  (0.032) 
Failure rate parameters             
Difference-in-mean estimates             
  years 93-94  0.102 **  (0.015)    0.210 **  (0.021) 
  years 95-97  0.067 **  (0.014)    0.131 **  (0.019) 
Other variables             
  area  0.081 **  (0.006)    -0.005    (0.011) 
  population  0.065 **  (0.005)    -0.153 **  (0.008) 
  per cap income  -0.092 **  (0.031)    -0.047    (0.045) 
  capital cost  1.147 **  (0.059)    1.267 **  (0.079) 
  labor cost  0.004 
  (0.048)     0.087    (0.058) 
  midwest  0.057 **  (0.015)    0.170 **  (0.025) 
  south  0.255 **  (0.015)    0.208 **  (0.025) 
  west  -0.022    (0.020)    0.146 **  (0.032) 
  constant  -1.910 **  (0.016)    -2.532 **  (0.027) 
Nuisance parameters   
          
sU
2   
      0.041 **  (0.016) 
sV
2   
      0.274 **  (0.008) 
r   
      -0.542 **  (0.158) 
correlation   
      -0.687 
   
Log likelihood  -77836.48    -73989.15 
Pseudo R
 2  0.446    0.090 
N  30,578    30,578 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.   
Note:  Dependent variable:  total number of food stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  
The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-1992. Heterogeneous 
likelihood evaluated by 20 point Gauss-Laguerre quadrature.  Pseudo R
2 is 1-L1/L0, 
where L0 is an intercepts (plus sU
2, sV
2, and r in the heterogeneous model) only model 
and L1 is the full model. Table 6:  Model B—ADA-Specific Variables and FEP Diff-in-Diff 
  No Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate 
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Entry rate parameters   
           
Difference estimates   
          
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.672  **   (0.066)    -0.357 **   (0.111) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  0.040     (0.072)    -0.017    (0.093) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.327  **   (0.013)    -0.064 **   (0.020) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.036  **   (0.009)    -0.015    (0.013) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  -0.090     (0.046)    -0.054    (0.072) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  0.142  **   (0.019)    0.101 **   (0.033) 
               
Difference-in-difference estimates               
  FEP state, 1993-94  -0.101  **   (0.033)    -0.070    (0.050) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  -0.037     (0.027)    -0.077    (0.040) 
               
Main effects (apply to all years)               
  % adults disabled  0.111  **   (0.041)    0.126 *   (0.054) 
  FEP state  -0.006     (0.018)    0.013    (0.025) 
               
Failure rate parameters               
Difference estimates               
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.467  **   (0.060)    -0.539 **   (0.090) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.037     (0.068)    -0.218 **   (0.083) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.524  **   (0.013)    -0.477 **   (0.018) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -0.019  *   (0.009)    0.004    (0.012) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-1994  0.009     (0.056)    -0.153    (0.114) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-1997  0.138  **   (0.016)    0.149 **   (0.025) 
               
Difference-in-difference estimates               
  FEP state, 1993-94  -0.162  **   (0.029)    -0.123 **   (0.038) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  -0.010     (0.025)    0.024    (0.034) 
               
Main effects (apply to all years)               
  % adults disabled  -0.007     (0.040)    0.146 **   (0.051) 
  FEP state  -0.036  *   (0.017)    -0.044 *   (0.023) 
   
         
Includes Controls from Model A  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
 2  0.451  0.095 
Log likelihood  -77078.11   -73547.72 
 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.  N = 30,578.  Dependent variable:  total number of food 
stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-
1992.  Specification also includes all variables in specification A, previous table. Table 8:  Model C 
  No Heterogeneity  Heterogeneity 
   estimate 
  s.e.    estimate
  s.e. 
Small firms differenced off large firms   
          
Entry rate parameters   
           
Difference-in-difference estimates            
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.750  **   (0.170)    -0.506 *   (0.205) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  0.122     (0.156)    0.063    (0.181) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.230  **   (0.033)    -0.022    (0.039) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.010     (0.022)    0.021    (0.026) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  -0.342     (0.199)    -0.261    (0.221) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  0.061     (0.049)    0.048    (0.059) 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences                
  FEP state, 1993-94  -0.184  *   (0.075)    -0.127    (0.090) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  0.057     (0.063)    0.044    (0.076) 
Failure rate parameters               
Difference-in-difference estimates               
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -0.558  **   (0.184)    -0.665 **   (0.215) 
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -0.113     (0.159)    -0.268    (0.183) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -0.366  **   (0.035)    -0.316 **   (0.041) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.003     (0.025)    0.005    (0.028) 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  -0.271     (0.207)    -0.301    (0.246) 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  0.025     (0.049)    0.038    (0.058) 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences                
  FEP state, 1993-94  -0.351  **   (0.078)    -0.308 **   (0.092) 
  FEP state, 1995-97  0.067     (0.067)    0.107    (0.079) 
Medium firms differenced off large 
firms               
Entry rate parameters   
           
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  0.039     (0.037)    0.044    (0.042) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.017     (0.027)    0.030    (0.030) 
Failure rate parameters               
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  0.081  *   (0.040)    0.092 *   (0.046) 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  0.075  **   (0.028)    0.063    (0.032) 
 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance.  N = 30,578.  Dependent variable:  total number of food 
stores (SIC 5400) in county in year.  The excluded period dummy is the pre-ADA period 1988-
1992.  Specification also includes all variables in specification A, Table 5. Table 9:  Magnitude of the Estimates from Specification C— 
Effect on the Nationwide Number of Firms, Entry, and Exit 
 
 
Effect of a 1 std. dev.  
increase in the row variable
   
Effect of a “0 to actual value”  



















Small firms differenced off 
large firms                             
Difference-in-difference 
estimates                             
  % adults disabled, 1993-94  -1,689.2   -3,008.3  **  -1,179.5  **  -1,828.8                
  % adults disabled, 1995-97  -2,148.4 **  845.4    271.7    573.6                 
  Title III case rate, 1993-94  -147.6   -908.1    -200.2    -708.0    -61.0    -378.8    -81.4    -297.3 
  Title III case rate, 1995-97  -1,054.2   2,152.0    1,186.9    965.0    -775.1    1,531.7    852.4    679.3 
Difference-in-difference-in-
differences                           
   
 
  FEP state, 1993-94
†  15,631.6   -2,807.8  *  -3,198.8  **  391.0                 
  FEP state, 1995-97
†  15,335.0 **  -395.3    -859.2    463.9                 
Medium firms differenced off 
large firms        
     
          
     
  EEOC charge rate, 1993-94  -1,339.1 **  76.6    3.4  *  73.2    -1,149.0  **  70.1    10.7  *  59.4 
  EEOC charge rate, 1995-97  -643.5 **  29.2     185.2  **  -156.1    -1,119.9  **  53.6     282.0  **  -228.4 
 
† Effect of a zero to one change in the row variable. 
* = 5% significance; ** = 1% significance; based on significance of estimates in Tables 4 and 7.   
Notes:  all figures are numbers of firms.  DN (Direct Estimate) is based on coefficients from the estimations from Table 4.  DEntry and DExit are 
based on coefficients from the estimations from Table 7, “no heterogeneity” specification.  DN (Implied) is calculated as DEntry minus DExit.  All 
figures are calculated using actual values of the covariates for each county (except for the row variable, as noted in the column headings), and 
aggregated up to the national level.  All period differences are with respect to the pre-ADA period. Figure 1 
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